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INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT UNDER THE
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT: THE BONA FIDE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PLAN EXCEPTION
I. Introduction
The purpose of the Age Discrimination Employment Act
(ADEA) I is "to promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age . "2 ADEA covers workers who
are at least forty years of age but less than sixty-five.3 The setting
of these age limits, particularly the lower limit,4 was the cause of
much debate during the formation of the law.'
After examining the problems of older persons seeking employ-
ment, Congress concluded that the unemployment rate for older
workers was much higher than for younger workers.' It found that
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
2. Id. § 621(b) (1970).
3. Id. § 631.
4. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1967) (Supp. Views). Airline steward-
esses were one of the groups pushing for a lower age limit than forty. The subcommittee
concluded that this problem could be solved without the lowering of the age limit below that
age. It decided to focus the limited resources of the government on protecting workers over
age forty in order to confront the problem where the most flagrant abuses had been recog-
nized. Id.
5. The age limits of the ADEA have met with considerable criticism on both practical and
constitutional grounds. See Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory
Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 DUQUESNE L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1974); Note, Age
Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment,
47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1974). In addition to the constitutional infirmities and social harsh-
ness noted by the commentators, the ADEA age limits, apparently designed to maximize the
law's effectiveness, may actually have the opposite effect: "By establishing 65 as an age at
which workers are no longer entitled to statutory protection against age discrimination, the
Act may lend support to the common misconception that the aging process renders older
workers incompetent, a misconception that discourages voluntary compliance with the
ADEA." Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 924, 945 n.ll0 (1975).
Nevertheless, after having heard all the legal and philosophical arguments in favor of
change, Congress, when it amended the Act in 1974, decided to retain the original
upper and lower age limits. Therefore, at least for the moment, the "relatively" old
and young have been left without the benefits of federal law to aid them in protecting
their employment status.
Levien, supra, at 230.
6. "[Hlalf of all private job openings are barred to applicants over 55; a quarter to those
over 45. Over a third of all men who have been employed "7 weeks or more-the 'hard core'
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the setting of arbitrary age limits had become common within in-
dustry and that the only effective way to combat this problem was
to enact legislation which would eliminate age discrimination in
employment hiring practices.7
ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer:'
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; or...
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age
Responsibility for the enforcement of the statute rests with the
Secretary of Labor.' Its legislative history demonstrates that Con-
gress wanted the Secretary to implement the informal methods of
conciliation, conference and persuasion before taking legal action.'
The problems encountered in the enforcement of ADEA can be
divided into two types: (1) problems similar to all civil rights legisla-
tion (i.e., the need to prove a prima facie case of discrimination);"
and (2) those problems unique to ADEA. 2 Within the second cate-
unemployed-are over 45-although this group makes up slightly less than a quarter of the
work force." 113 CONG. REc. 34746 (1967) (remarks of Representative John H. Dent). "[Also]
over three-quarters of a million persons 45 years of age or older-most of them under 65-are
looking for work and cannot obtain it; they comprise 27 percent of the unemployed but 40
percent of the long-term unemployed; and they account for three-quarters of the one billion
in unemployment benefits which are disbursed annually." 113 CONG. REc. 34752 (1967) (re-
marks of Representative Florence P. Dwyer).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
8. Id. § 623(a).
9. Id. § 626(b).
10. See Levien, supra note 5, at 231-35.
11. Under the provisions of ADEA, a plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case
of age discrimination. In ascertaining what criteria will constitute a showing of age discrimi-
nation the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applied
a four prong test: (1) the complainant must be within the protected group; (2) he must have
applied for and been qualified for a job for which the defendant was seeking applicants; (3)
despite his qualifications, he must have been rejected; (4) after his rejection the complainant
must show that the defendant continued to seek applicants for the position. Id. at 802.
Although McDonnell Douglas was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the similarity between the substantive provisions of Title VII and ADEA leads to the conclu-
sion that the same standards of proof apply in cases of age discrimination. See Wilson v.
Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1970).
19771 NOTES
gory are the three exceptions'3 to the statute's general prohibition
against age discrimination.
The first exception simply allows an employer to make employ-
ment decisions for valid reasons other than age (e.g., good cause
discharges)." However, an employment decision that is in any way
motivated by age factors remains unlawful." The remaining excep-
tions specifically allow age considerations to enter the employment
decision. Thus, it is not unlawful for an employer, employment
agency or labor organization "to take any action otherwise prohib-
ited. . . where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business
... ,, 11The most common example is the mandatory retirement
of commercial airline pilots at age sixty. This exception is predi-
cated upon considerations of public safety." The last exception al-
lows an employer to retire an employee before the age of sixty-five,
if that employee is covered by such a bona fide employee benefit
plan.'"
13. Id.
14. The employee may continue to make employment decisions "where the differentiation
is based upon reasonable factors other than age," Id. § 623(f)(1), or "to discharge or otherwise
discipline an individual for good cause." Id. § 623(f)(3).
15. Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 510 (D.D.C. 1974); Brennan v.
Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (good cause discharge).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). Most of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ) defense cases deal with employers who are entrusted with serving the public and with
the occupational skills of employees which are affected by the degenerative physical changes
caused by aging. See Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
rev 'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). There
must be a well documented case showing that the age group discriminated against cannot
perform the job because of their age (e.g., a showing of degenerative physical changes caused
by aging that have a detrimental impact on motor skills, inter alia, fast reflex action). "Of
particular note was the court's apparent acquiesence [in the Greyhound case] in the general
proposition that all people undergo the same type of degenerative physical changes as they
age, and that each 'over 35' applicant therefore need not be given an individualized test to
discover whether or not he qualifies for employment." Levien, supra note 5, at 238-39. See
also Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 728 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
Greyhound thus rejected the Labor Department's position regarding the rejection of appli-
cants due to a BFOQ. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103(d), 860.103(f)(1)(iii) (1975).
17. Courts have been more lenient in sustaining a finding of BFOQ exception where the
job places the employee in a special relationship to the public at large. See Airlines Pilots
Ass'n v. Quesada, 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 366 U.S. 962 (1961); McIlvaine
v. Pennsylvania State Police, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S.
986 (1974).
18. The most significant aspect of the exemption, the legal meaning of the words "bona
fide," remains to be defined by the government and tested in the courts. The United States
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Excluding the procedural issues of notice"9 and jurisdiction, 0 the
most litigated section of ADEA is the bona fide employee benefit
plan exception." This Note will examine that exception and the
conflicting court interpretations of it.22 These interpretations deal
with the applicability of the statute to benefit plans effectuated
before its passage, and the validity of involuntary retirement before
age sixty-five pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan.
II. Bona Fide Employee Benefit Plans
Section 623(f)(2) of ADEA provides: 3
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organi-
zation . . . to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
Department of Labor in its interpretative bulletin stated that "[a] retirement, pension, or
insurance plan will be considered in compliance with the statute where the actual amount of
payment made, or cost incurred, in behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred
in behalf of a younger worker, even though the older workers may thereby receive a lesser
amount of pension or retirement benefits . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1975). This points out
the need for employers not to discriminate between younger and older workers in administer-
ing employee benefit plans, but it does not answer the question what is a bona fide plan. In
Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff claimed that
the company's profit sharing plan would not be a bona fide employee benefit plan under the
ADEA since the plan failed to meet the requirements of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
guidelines concerning bona fide pensions. These guidelines defined retirement plans "as
including only those plans where employer contributions are based upon the anticipated costs
of retirement, thereby excluding plans such as Taft's 'Profit Sharing Retirement Plan', in
which contributions are based only upon profit." Id. at 216. The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument concluding that "the purpose of the [IRS] Bulletin is to provide guidance for
taxpayers in obtaining special tax treatment afforded by I.R.C. §§ 401-404. The purpose of
the Act [ADEA] is to outlaw discrimination against older workers. There is no apparent
relationship between what the IRS says for the purpose of taxpayer guidance and what
Congress means when it passes a statute for the purpose of promoting employment of older
workers." Id. Although it is entirely unclear what a bona fide employee benefit plan is under
ADEA, Congress has recently enacted legislation dealing specifically with retirement and
pension plans. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1381 (Supp. V, 1975), might possibly become the guideline courts will use in the future when
deciding what is a bona fide employee benefit plan under ADEA. For a discussion of the
substantial benefits test in determining if a pension plan is bona fide or not, see note 53 infra.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
22. Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977); McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-
906); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974); Dunlop v. Hawaiian
Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
NOTES
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan,
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that
no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual
The bona fide employee retirement plan exception was enacted
by Congress for the purpose of encouraging employers to hire older
workers. Employers feared that they would be forced to hire older
employees and offer them the same pension benefits that younger
workers were receiving. 4 Aware of this problem, the House Educa-
tion and Labor Committee stated in its report on ADEA: "It is
important to note that exception (3) applies to new and existing
employee benefit plans, and to both the establishment and mainte-
nance of such plans. This exception serves to emphasize the primary
purpose of the bill,-hiring of older workers-by permitting employ-
ment without necessarily including such workers in employee bene-
fit plans."25 Congressman Dominick V. Daniels, a member of the
General Subcomittee on Labor which held the hearings on ADEA,
commented on the effect this bill would have on employers: "[T]he
bill takes into full consideration . . . the problem of employers in
the field of pension and other benefit plans. The bill would permit
the hiring of older workers without requiring that they necessarily
be included in all employee benefit plans. This provision is designed
to maximize employment possibilities without working an undue
24. One commentator has noted:
The original Johnson administration version of the ADEA allowed an employer 'to
separate involuntarily an employee under a retirement policy or system where such
.. . system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purpose of this Act' . . . [Tihis
exception was 'intended to protect retirement plans . . .' [T]he exact nature and
object of this protection, however, is ambiguous: [the protection could have been for
the policy of involuntary retirement itself], or that these pension . . . plans [were to
bel protected from the Act's prohibitions when involuntary retirement is necessary to
preserve the fiscal viability of such plans.
The latter interpretation is not without support. The American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T), for example suggested in Senate testimony that if age
classifications were prohibited in its pension plans, a 45 year-old employee with 20
years of service might be able to claim the same right to retire as the 60 year-old
employee with 20 years of service-something not possible under its existing plans-
thus substantially increasing the cost of the plans . . . This concern led AT&T to
propose an alternative . . . [that] was adopted by Congress.
Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 924, 950 n.141 (1975) (citations
omitted). See also 113 CONG. REc. 31254-55 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits).
25. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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hardship on employers in providing special and costly benefits."2
Until recently, 7 both judicial28 and administrative rulings29 on
cases have interpreted section 623(f)(2) literally and found it per-
missible for an employer to compel the retirement of an employee
under the age of sixty-five pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan.3"
However, the employer is expressly forbidden from retiring the same
employee involuntarily if he is not a participant in such a plan.'
In Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 32 the earliest decision deal-
ing with this problem, the Fifth Circuit broadly construed the word-
ing of section 623(f)(2) to permit an employer to retire an employee
before age sixty-five if the employee was a member of a bona fide
retirement plan. In Taft a voluntary participant 3 in the defendant's
"Profit Sharing Retirement Plan '3 was forced to retire at the age
of sixty, the plan's normal retirement age.35 Although a clause in the
plan empowered the company to permit employment beyond that
date, the employer denied the request for later retirement. The
26. 113 CONG. REC. 34746 (1967).
27. See Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977); McMann v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No.
76-906): Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976).
28. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1975).
30. McMann states a contrary view: the "voluntary" act of an employee in joining a plan
is not voluntary in the sense that it would effectuate a waiver of his statutory protection under
the law. 542 F.2d at 219"n.1.
31. Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971); 29
C.F.R. § 860.110(b) (1975).
32. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
33. The appellant in Taft argued that he never saw the complete provisions of the plan
but only a summary; therefore, he was not a voluntary participant since he was never in-
formed that age sixty was the mandatory retirement age of the plan. Thus the plan was not
binding on him. Id. at 217.
34. The appellant also argued that the Taft retirement plan was not bona fide since it
was entirely funded from company profits, and not based upon "the anticipated cost of
retirement." The appellant pointed out that the plan did not qualify as a bona fide retirement
plan under the guidelines established by the IRS. The court concluded that the guidelines
were meaningless because there was no apparent relationship between what the IRS states
for the purpose of taxpayer guidance and what Congress means when it passes a statute for
the purpose of promoting employment of older workers. Id. at 216. The court reasoned that
the key words in section 623(f)(2) were "bona fide employee benefit plan" and that the words
"retirement, person or insurance" were just descriptive, which did not exclude any other
types of employee benefit plans. Id. at 215.
35. See note 32 supra.
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employee then brought suit to enjoin the violation of his rights
under ADEA.36 The court of appeals affirmed the district court deci-
sion3" in favor of the defendant declaring that the plan was bona
fide,3" and that the plan could not have been a subterfuge to evade
the statute39 because it was effectuated prior to the enactment of
ADEA.40
In Dunlop v. Hawaiian Telephone Co. (Hawtel),"1 the services of
defendant's employees were terminated involuntarily pursuant to a
bona fide retirement plan adopted prior to the effective date of
ADEA.12 The plan permitted a member to retire voluntarily upon
attaining the age of sixty, 3 and it also allowed the company to
compel retirement at that age." The plan made retirement manda-
tory at the age of seventy;45 however, a member could be retained
beyond that age at the election of the company."9 The district court,
in finding for the defendant, concluded that a new interpretation of
section 623(f)(2) was required so as to give its application some
meaning. 7 It held that in order for the bona fide employee benefit
plan exception 8 to have any purpose, the phrase "subterfuge to
evade the purposes of this chapter"' 9 could not be construed literally
because the exception allowed by section 623(f)(2) was just such a
subterfuge. 0 The court interpreted the term "subterfuge" as deny-
36. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1970).
37. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 222 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
38. See note 33 supra.
39. The Taft court concluded that all plans that were enacted prior to ADEA were bona
fide. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. The plaintiff had become a member of the plan in 1963, but the provisions of the
ADEA were not enacted until 1967. 500 F.2d at 214.
41. 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976) [hereinafter referred to as Hawtel].
42. Hawtel's plan was adopted in 1931. Although the plan was amended in 1965, 1967 and
1971, section 3(1)(b), pertaining to retirement, and at issue in this dispute has never been





47. Id. at 332.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
49. Id.
50. ADEA's purpose as defined makes it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual .. .because of such individual's age .... " 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The
exception for bona fide employee benefit plans allows employers to do that, which is exactly
forbidden by the statute.
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ing the protection of section 623(f)(2)" to a defendant employer
"only if the defendant uses a retirement plan as a subterfuge to
retire an employee without the payment of substantial benefits."52
Because the plaintiffs had received substantial benefits under the
plan subsequent to their retirement, the court ruled that the plan
was not a subterfuge and therefore the defendant had the right to
assert this exception as a valid defense. 3
Taft concluded that any plan adopted prior to ADEA was im-
mune to the prohibitions of the statute whereas the Hawtel court
stated that all plans, whether adopted prior to or after ADEA, were
subject to its provisions. Hawtel also noted that forced retirement
before age sixty-five pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan
was valid only if the plan paid out substantial benefits to the reti-
rees.
Recent decisions have disagreed with Taft's conclusion that any
plan which is adopted prior to ADEA is immune from the statute's
prohibitions." In McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc.,5 plaintiff em-
ployee had been retired involuntarily by defendant United Air Lines
pursuant to a voluntary employee benefit plan.5 Defendant ob-
tained a summary judgment in the district court because the man-
datory retirement provision had been adopted prior to AEDA.5 In
holding for the plaintiff, the court of appeals stated that an em-
ployer may not retire employees involuntarily before the age of
51. 415 F. Supp. at 332. The court relied heavily on the interpretations promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor concerning this section of the Act, 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1975), which
states: "the Act authorizes involuntary retirement irrespective of age, provided that such
retirement is pursuant to the terms of a retirement or pension plan meeting the requirements
of section 4(f)(2) .... "
52. 415 F. Supp. 330, 331 (D. Hawaii 1976).
53. The eight plaintiff's had received over $120,000 in the form of retirement benefits
among them. The court did not rule on what constituted substantial benefits but just stated
that in this case the benefits were adequate. Id. at 331. For a discussion of what constitutes
substantial benefits, see Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.
2d 307 (1965).
54. See Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977); McMann v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No.
76-906); Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976).
55. 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No.
76-906).
56. 542 F.2d at 218-19.
57. Id. at 218.
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sixty-five if they are members of a bona fide employee retirement
plan, and if their retirement is predicated on an arbitrary age provi-
sion in the plan.5" The court concluded that there must be some
basis, other than age, for a plan which discriminates between em-
ployees on that basis.5" Thus, it found United Air Lines' retirement
plan was not entitled to the protection of section 623(f)(2) because
United conceded that the economic survival of its pension plan
would not be impaired by allowing employees to continue working
up to the age of sixty-five. 0
In arriving at its decision the court of appeals faced two distinct
issues. First, the court rejected United's argument that its pension
plan was not subject to the prohibition of ADEA because it was
adopted prior to the enactment of that statute. The court noted that
it was the intent of Congress to make all employee benefit plans
subject to ADEA.11 The court pointed to the House Education and
Labor Committee report on section 623(f)(2) which clearly stated
that the section applied to both existing as well as new employee
benefit plans."2
Second, the court found that United's retirement plan was not
entitled to the protection of 623(f)(2) because it was "a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of the Act." 3 The court stated that "what is
forbidden is not a subterfuge to evade the Act, but a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the Act."'" Any other reading of the
"subterfuge" clause, the court reasoned, would produce inequitable
results. 5 In arriving at this decision the court considered the inher-
58. Id. at 221-22. The court did state that "if legitimate considerations other than an
employer's preference for youth justify the forced retirement of employees before age 65, 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(2), as we construe it, permits such action." Id. at 222. The court stated that
United could assert other valid defenses, such as a BFOQ, but in order for them to avail
themselves of its protection they would have to carry the burden of proof in establishing these
defenses. Id. at 219 n.3.
59. Id. at 221. See note 58 supra for an explanation of when an employee benefit plan
may discriminate on the basis of age.
60. 542 F.2d at 222.
61. Id. at 221.
62. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see text accompanying note 25 supra.
63. 542 F.2d at 220.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 220-21. The court made its strongest argument in favor of its interpretation of
the meaning of the word subterfuge by pointing out that following the logic of the Taft
decision "would produce the absurd result that an employer could discharge an employee
pursuant to a retirement plan for no reason other than age, but then could not refuse to rehire
1977] NOTES
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ent ambiguity of the statute.6 The court also relied on the new
interpretation of 623(f)(2) made by the Department of Labor in a
January 1975 report pertaining to ADEA which stated: 7
Retirements before 65 are unlawful unless the mandatory retirement provi-
sion: (1) is contained in a bona fide pension or retirement plan, (2) is required
by the terms of the plan and is not optional, and (3) is essential to the plan's
economic survival or to some other legitimate purpose-i.e., is not in the plan
for the sole purpose of moving out older workers, which purpose has now been
made unlawful by the ADEA.
Thus in holding for the plaintiff, the court concluded that Taft,
which rested its holding on a reading of the "unambiguous language
of the statute, '6 8 had disregarded "the legislative history and policy
considerations which it had conceded might support a different re-
sult.""6
The Fourth Circuit's decision in McMann can be contrasted with
the Third Circuit's decision in Zinger v. Blanchette. ° Plaintiff, an
employee of the defendant, was involuntarily retired before the age
of sixty-five pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan.7 He asserted
that this forced retirement discriminated against him because of his
age, and therefore it violated his rights under ADEA.72 Plaintiff also
relied on the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of section 623(f)(2)
which prohibited the forced retirement of an employee before the
age of sixty-five pursuant to a bona fide benefit plan except where
the fiscal viability of the plan was in danger.73 Defendant company
the presumptively otherwise-qualified individual for 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) explicitly provides
that "no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual ......
Id. The court also pointed out that .'[clonceptually there is no difference between a manda-
tory retirement age of sixty-two and a refusal to hire anyone who is sixty-two years old."' Id.
at 221, quoting Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.
Minn. 1971).
66. See note 65 supra.
67. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, JANUARY 1975 REPORT PERTAINING TO AcTIvrrIES IN CONNECTION
WITH THE AGE OF DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, at 17 (1975).
68. 542 F.2d at 220, quoting Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir.
1974).
69. 542 F.2d at 220.
70. 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 902.
72. Id. at 904.
73. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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asserted that the bona fide employee plan exception permitted it to
retire the plaintiff before the age of sixty-five."
In holding for the defendant, the court of appeals rejected the
Secretary's interpretation of section 623(f)(2)1" because: (1) it was
in contradiction with an earlier interpretation which was sanctioned
by the Secretary soon after the passage of ADEA;11 (2) it was not in
accord with the intent of Congress as evidenced by the legislative
history;" and (3) it was attempting "to change the Act by court
decision or administrative fiat. ''7 8
The Zinger court conceded that there were several reasons why
involuntary retirement, even with an adequate pension, should not
be permitted before the age of sixty-five." However, it concluded
that the merit of the bona fide employee benefit plan exception was
a matter of legislative concern and evaluation."
III. Conclusion
Over eleven million employees are members of retirement plans
which require retirement before the age of sixty-five;8 several mil-
lion employees are members of plans which permit employees to
compel retirement before the age of sixty-five.82 Because of the di-
74. 549 F.2d at 904-05.
75. Id. at 908-09.
76. 34 Fed. Reg. 9709 (June 21, 1969). "Thus the Act authorizes involuntary retirement
irrespective of age, provided that such retirement is pursuant to the terms of a retirement or
pension plan meeting the requirements of section 4(f)(2)." Id.
76. The court pointed out the attempt by labor organizations to influence an amendment
to ADEA which would have prohibited involuntary retirement before age sixty-five. The
proposed amendment was not included in the final draft of the bill which eventually became
ADEA. 549 F.2d at 907. The court also pointed out that ADEA contained section 624, which
called upon the Secretary of Labor "to study the institutional arrangements giving rise to
involuntary and to report his findings, together with any legislative recommendations to the
President and to Congress." Id. at 908.
77. Id. at 909.
78. The court was aware of the reasoning in McMann concerning the anomaly under
ADEA whereby a worker could be involuntarily retired before age sixty-five pursuant to a
bona fide retirement plan by one company but could not be discriminated against by another
company. The court merely stated that Congress was aware of the problem, and if it decided
to await further information before taking action that was within its scope of authority. Zinger
concluded that "[iut is not the function of the courts to accelerate that process when Con-
gress unquestionably is acting within its proper scope." Id.
80. Id.
81. See MONTHLY LAB. REv., April 1973, at 41-42.
82. Id.
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vergence in the decisions by the various circuits on the scope of
section 623(f)(2),1 3 the creators of these employee benefit plans are
in a state of uncertainty as to the fiscal viability of their plans.
Thus, a uniform interpretation of the scope of section 623(f)(2) by
the Supreme Court is essential.
The resolution of McMann and Zinger is imminent. The Supreme
Court will review the McMann decision in the near future."4 The
Court should recognize that all employee benefit plans, whether
effectuated before or after ADEA, are subject to the statute's prohi-
bitions against age discrimination. 5 A close reading of the legisla-
tive history of section 623(f)(2) supports a decision overruling
McMann, because Congress never intended to prohibit involuntary
retirement before age sixty-five pursuant to a bona fide employee
benefit plan.8 However, it seems clear from the trend of recent
Supreme Court decisions87 that the Court will decide McMann in
favor of the employer.
Robert F. Tully
83. See Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977); McMann v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No.
76-906); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974); Dunlop v. Hawaiian
Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976).
84. McMann v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-906).
85. Except for Taft, all of the other decisions have agreed that ADEA applies to employee
benefit plans adopted prior to as well as after the enactment of that Act.
86. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. The direction by Congress to the
Secretary of Labor to study the effects of involuntary retirement on workers and report his
findings back to them is ample evidence in itself that they had not prohibited involuntary
retirement in the bill. See 29 U.S.C. § 624 (1970).
87. General Elec. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976); United Housing Foundation v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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